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When Genghis Khan established the 
Mongol Empire in 1291， it was the 
greatest empire in history. But the 
Mongolian people were later subjected to 
230 years of Chinese rule from 1691 to 
1921. After three years of constitutional 
monarchy， the Mongolian People's Repub-
lic was founded in 1924 and experienced 
the second longest history of socialism 
and centrally-planned economy after the 
neighboring“big brother"， the Soviet Un-
ion. However， in January 1990 demon-
strations for democracy took place， and 
in August the first democratic election 
was held. A new coalition government 
was established and in September it 
made plans for a transition to a market田
oriented economy. Mongolia thus took the 
first step towards a market-oriented eco-
nomy， but there have been many difficul 
ties hindering the transition and the 
further development of her economy. 
This paper is intended as an inves-
tigation of the Mongolian economy in 
transition to a market-oriented economy. 
Needless to say， development strategy is 
very important to consider， but it cannot 
be discussed here for lack of space. We 
have to leave it to another paper. In the 
present paper， the distinctive character-
istics of the Mongolian economy wiU be 
described in Chapter 1 the economic 
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structure will be examined in Chapter I; 
and the background， the contents and the 
major problems of economic reform will 
be presented in Chapter m. 
1. INITIAL CONDITIONS 
When we consider how best to de-
velop and assist the Mongolian economy， 
it is necessary to make c1ear the given 
initial conditions. The characteristics of 
the history， land and population， geo四
graphical conditions， livestock sector， 
mineral resources， aid-dependent eco-
nomy and human resources will be ex-
plained briefly in this chapter. 
1. Long History of Socialist Economy 
Up to 1921， when the country re 
covered its independence with the assist-
ance of the Soviet Union， Mongolia had 
long been ruled by the Chinese dynasty. 
Since then， she has transformed herself 
from a nomadic rural economy to a mix-
ture of traditional stock farming and 
modern industries (mainly mining and 
semi-processing of raw materials). In the 
1930s， a pro-Soviet government came 
into power， and thereafter Mongolia 
gradually inc1ined towards a Soviet-type 
centrally-planned economy. Collectiviza-
tion of stock farming was then intro-
duced with a resultant sharp decrease in 
livestock. 
But the real step towards a socialist， 
centrally-planned economy was made af-
ter WWII， particularly after 1960 when 
al property， inc1uding livestock， became 
cooperative-or state-own巴dand private 
ownership was prohibited. Large and 
medium-scale industries， finance， exter-
nal and internal trade， railroad and air 
transport， communications， and farms al 
became state-owned; and stock farming， 
retail trade and small scale industries 
became cooperative-owned. Economic de-
velopment was implemented by the gov-
ernment along five year plans， the first 
of which started in 1948. In 1962， Mon-
golia joined the CMEA (Conference of 
Mutual Economic Assistance) and be-
came more dependent on assistance from 
and trade with other member countries， 
particularly with the Soviet Union. 
In the eighth five year plan (1985-
90)， limited economic reforms were intro 
duced into the socialist regime: limited 
autonomy was、grantedto public sector 
enterprises for investment， long-term 
bank loans for investment were intro-
duced and wholesale prices were in-
creased in 1986; investment autonomy of 
public sector enterprises was expanded 
in 1987; agricultural pricing and mar-
keting in excess of state orders was 
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liberalized in 1988; and in 1989. intra-
public-sector-enterprise pricing was libe 
ralized and operating autonomy was ex-
panded. restrictions on private herd own-
ership were eased and the monopoly of 
state trading corporations was eliminated. 
At last. fundamental reforms were 
introduced in 1990 when the first demo 
cratic election was conducted and the 
new government declared the transition 
to a market-oriented economy: restric-
tions on private ownership of herds were 
eliminated; selected retail prices were 
liberalized; and a foreign exchange auc-
tion system was introduced in 1990. But 
thus far about two generations of Mongo-
lian people have experienced a centrally 
planned command economy. remote from 
market mechanism and entrepreneurship. 
This will be the most difficult problem 
for the Mongolian economy to develop in 
the future. 
2. Small Population in a Largeしand
Mongolia has a population of only 
2.2 mi1lion as of 1991~ which is less 
than that of Singapore. a city-state with a 
population of some 2.7 million. This 
means the domestic market is too small 
1 Unless otherwise specified. al data in this paper 
are from the State Statistical Ofice of Mongolia. 
A附 ualStatistical刀arbook.1992. and World Bank. 
M側 goliα:Co附 tryEc開酔nicMemora仰du隅.1991 
to establish self-contained manufacturing 
industries and thus external trade poli-
cies to overcome this handicap are im-
portant. although it may be relatively 
easy to make development and assistance 
plans because of its smallness. 
The rate of population growth has 
been high (2.7%) in the past 10 years. 
but the land is sparsely populated be-
cause of its largeness (1.567 thousand 
knf. about 4 times larger than Japan. which 
has a population of 125 million). The 
sparsely populated economy is difficult 
to integrate into one national economy. if 
there is a lack in effective transportation 
and communication networks; therefore. 
such kinds of infrastructure are neces-
sary for Mongolian development. 
Though the country is free from the 
excessive population problem that other 
Asian countries are suffering. it does 
have the problem of urban concentration. 
The rate of urban population to the total 
is 56%. which is higher than most Asian 
countries: Nepal 10%. Bangladesh 16%. 
Laos 19%. Thailand 23%. India 27%. In 
donesia 31%. Pakistan 32%. the Philip-
pines and Malaysia 43%. China 56%; 
only South Korea 72% and Japan 77% 
were higher than Mongolia in 1990." 
2 World Bank. World Development Report. 1992 
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The three biggest cities together 
contain one-third of the population: the 
capital Ulaanbaatar alone has more than 
one-fourth (580 thousand)， the second 
biggest Darhan (90 thousand)， and the 
third Erdenet (60 thousand). The popula-
tion is so concentrated in urban areas 
that most development and assistance 
projects may be easier to implement， but 
it wi1 take longer and cost more to ex-
tend the effects to rural areas. 
3. Land-Iocked Country Sandwiched 
between Two Superpowers 
Geographically， Mongolia is a land-
locked country sandwiched between two 
superpowers， China and Russia. This has 
both advantages and disadvantages. Mon-
golia can gain from trade between these 
two countries with their huge popula-
tions. Many entrepot states had pros-
pered along the Silk Road in the past. 
However， problems of transportation may 
prevent this advantage from being real-
ized. For one thing， the gauge of railway 
is different from that in China， which re 
quires costly reloading at the border and 
takes too long. For another thing， road 
transport is very inefficient because of 
poor road and vehic1e maintenance for 
lack of money and necessary parts 
The geographic position of Mongolia 
can be a serious disadvantage as lohg as 
economic and political disorder continues 
in Russia， making it difficult to realize 
the possible gains from trade. In addi-
tion， as a land-locked economy， Mongolia 
has to produce light and high value-
added commodities to overcome the dis-
advantages of high transport costs. 
4. Resilient Livestock Sector 
Mongolia has an average elevation 
of about 1，600 meters above sea level， 
resulting in a frigid， semi-arid continen田
tal c1imate. Th巴wintersare long and se 
vere with average temperatures below 
the freezing point from October to 
March. These c1imatic conditions， how-
ever， are suitable for livestock raising， 
and more than ten sheep and cattle per 
capita are bred (some 25.5 million heads 
as of the end of 1991， about 60% of 
which are sheep). 
In the 1980s， agricultural produc-
tion made up about 20% of GDP， and， on 
average， around 30% of the labor force 
was engaged in agriculture. Most of them 
were in the livestock sector， and about 
40% of exports are of agricultural origin 
(foodstuffs， raw materials and livestock-
related products such as wool， leather， 
and skin). 
The importance of the livestock sec-
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tor is greater than these figures indicate， 
since most of their products have been 
underpriced by the government Due 
emphasis should be placed on this sector 
in future planning， as it could play an 
important role as a cushion to absorb the 
variety of disorders generated in the 
transition to a market-oriented economy_ 
The livestock sector is capable of play-
ing such a role， as it is the most self-
sufficient and least d巴pendenton gov 
ernmental supports_ Therefore this sec-
tor is quite resilient against the present 
economlc cnslS_ 
5_ Rich Mineral Resources 
Mongolia is relatively rich in such 
mineral resources as coal， copper， molyb-
denum and fluorite_ These minerals， cop-
per concentrate in particular， were the 
main exports to CMEA countries before 
the system collapsed in 1991， but they 
were viable as exports only in this sys-
tem where higher prices thah the inter 
national level were accepted as“friend 
ship prices"_ Now that int巴rnationalcom 
petitiveness is crucial to export these re-
sources， it is necessary to reduce the 
costs by improving efficiency in produc-
tion and transport Coal is relatively 
abundant in Mongolia and it is indispens-
able in both industrial production and 
urban life for heating and electricity_ 
The biggest problem at pr巴sentis how to 
maintain the supply of these minerals 
when the ex-Soviet Union can no longer 
provide the spare parts， gasoline and 
capital goods essential to their produc-
tion， transport and exploitation_ 
6_ Aid-dependent Economy 
in Collapse 
&onomic development in Mongolia 
was dependent on assistance from the 
Soviet Union until 1990_ Dependence 
was so strong that Mongolia's develop-
ment process was almost susp巴ndedand 
an economic crisis ensued when the 
Soviet Union itself collapsed in 1991 
and could no longer supply gasoline， fer-
tilizer， spare parts， etc_ to Mongolia_ The 
assistance had been given to Mongolia 
through financing the fiscal deficits 
equivalent to some 17% of GDP 
As long as Mongolia cannot finance 
her development projects for herself， she 
has to find another country or countries 
which will assist Mongolia asthe Soviet 
Union did before 1991. It will be im-
possible for Mongolia to succeed in self-
sustained economic development in the 
near future unless the Mongolian govern-
ment decides to accept a lower standard 
of living similar to that of 30 years ago_ 
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Th巴 Japanesegovernment may face the 
difficult decision of whether or not to 
take over the role of the dominant assist-
ance country from the Soviet Union. 
7. Well-developed Human Resources 
Though the new Mongolian govern-
ment inherited an aid-dependent economy 
from the former Socialist government， it
also inherited well-developed human re-
sources which should be used for cur-
rent economic development. The former 
government made extraordinary efforts 
in social services such as general educa-
tion and health care: the enrolment rates 
in primary and secondary education 
reached almost 100% in the 1980s; the 
adult literacy rate 98%; and the popula-
tion per physician. and medical personnel 
(105 and 205 persons respectively) and 
the lif巴 expectancyat birth (male 64.6 
years and female 66.5) have already 
reached the level of middle-income coun-
tries. It is becoming increasingly difficult 
to maintain this high level of human re-
sources und巴rthe present economic cri-
sis， but it seems tremendously important 
to maintain and make good use of such 
precious resources under a market 
oriented economic system. 
8. Least-developed Country 
According to Statistics 
It is said that Mongolia is a least-de-
veloped country. It is true that per capita 
GDP in 1991 is $58-86 converted by 
free market rates of 100-150 tugriks per 
dollar， or $216 by the official commer-
cial rate of 40 tugriks per dollar， and 
that they are well below the threshold of 
$300 which is used for the definition of 
least-developed countries. These figures， 
however， are rather problematic; the ofi-
cial rates did not reflect the real state of 
the Mongolian economy， and they were 
changed many times by the government 
from T3 to T5.6 =事1in June 1990， to 
T7.1 (the barter trade rate) or T40 (the 
comrriercial rate) in June 1991， and to 
T150 in January 1993. Also， the free 
market rates changed rapidly reflecting a 
temperamental condition of the thin fore-
ign exchange market: T100-150 in 
1991， T150-250 in 1992 and T250-
300 in the beginning of 1993. If we use 
the official rate of T5.6 or T7.1 in 1991， 
per capita GDP would be $1544 or 
事1218.
There are only a few estimates of 
per capita GDP which took the purchas-
ing power of the tugrik into considera-
tion:事800in 1986 estimated by DAC 
and $300 in 1988 by a Mongolian news 
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paper. Purchasing power parity is calcu-
lated for a basket of goods and services 
that an average family purchases. 
However， the basket of a Mongolian is so 
different from that of American， for ex-
ample， that such an estimation is ex-
tremely difficult and unreliable. In any 
case， Mongolian people may be able to 
survive with some cattle， but their lives 
are poor and hard according to western 
standards. 
n. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
The Mongolian economy had experi-
enced relatively high growth until 1989: 
the real annual rate of growth is 4.5% 
for GDP， 5.0% for Gross Social Product 
and Net Material Product in the 1980s. 
These high rates of growth were 
achieved with a huge amount of assist 
ance from the Soviet Union， as we have 
seen earlier. Such an aid-dependent de-
velopment method has seriously distorted 
the economic structure of Mongolia. In 
this chapter， production， employment， ex-
penditure， public finance， the balance of 
payments and external trade will be ex-
amined. 
1. Production 
It is rather difficult to have an accu-
rate understanding of the Mongolian eco-
nomy with such concepts as the Gross 
Social Product or Net Material Product 
that were used in the centrally回planned
economy before 1991. Therefore， GDP 
estimates by the W orld Bank will be 
used whenever possible. Basic differ-
ences between them are (1) Net Material 
Product does not include depreciation 
and services and (2) subsidies are not de-
ducted in NMP. Therefore， NMP is smal 
ler than GDP， for example by 19% in 
1989. 
As Table 1 indicates， on average， 
about 20% of GDP was created in the 
agricultural sector (including agriculture， 
livestock and forestry)， 40% in the in-
dustrial sector (construction， mining and 
manufacturing)， and another 40% in the 
service sector (transport， communica-
tions， trade and others in the material 
sector; and government， education， 
health， finance， housing， science， culture， 
etc. in the nonmaterial sector). In the 
1980s， the industrial sector increased its 
share from 36.3% to 41.1%， the agri-
cultural sector increased slightly from 
18.6% to 20.4%， but the service sector 
decreased from 45.1 % to 38.5%. 
In the longer run， however， the ris-
ing trend of the industrial sector and the 
declining trend in the agricultural sector 
are apparent: the industrial sector in-
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Table 1: COMPOSITION OF GDP， atcurrent factor cost (%) 
Sector 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Material 8l.3 83.4 83.0 82.9 82.6 83.6 83.5 
Agriculture 18.6 18.8 2l.8 19.5 19.4 20.4 20.2 
Industry 29.2 32.8 32.8 33.5 33.0 34.1 33.8 
Construction 7.1 5.7 6.2 6.8 7.2 7.0 5.7 
Transport 13.6 13.8 13.5 13.1 12.7 11.6 11.3 
Communications l.3 l.7 l.7 l.7 l.8 l.8 l.9 
Trade 9.7 9.1 5.3 6.6 7.1 7.1 9.1 
Other 2.0 l.6 l.8 l.7 l.5 l.6 l.4 
Nonmaterial 18.7 16.6 17.0 17.1 17.4 16.4 16.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
GDP Growth Rate 4目7 8.3 4.5 5.1 4.2 2.1 
Source: Calculated from the data of World Bank. 
Note: GDP growth rate is at constant market price in 1990. 
creased its share in Net Material Product 
from 9.3% in 1940 to 28.4% in 1970 
and 40.5% in 1990， whereas the agri-
cultural sector decreased from 61.0% to 
25.3% and 20.2% r巴spedively?
These trends of industrial expansion 
and agricultural contraction are a com-
mon feature to economic development， 
but in Mongolia over-hasty industrializa-
tion was pursued at the cost of agricul 
ture and of dependence on huge amounts 
of assistance， equivalent to some 30% of 
GDP， that was received from the Soviet 
Union. The high rate of the industrial 
sector in GDP (40%) is comparable to or 
even higher than more developed Asian 
LDCs (Malaysia 41%， Indonesia 40%， 
3 State Statistical Office of the MPR. National 
Ec側 omyof the MPR foγ70 yeαrs.1991 
Thailand 39%， the Philippines 35%， In 
dia 29%， Pakistan 25% in 1990) and 
much higher than some Least Developed 
Countries in Asia (Laos 20%， Banglad巴sh
15%， Nepal 14%). China (42%) is another 
socialist country in Asia that has has-
tened industrialization: Such a high rate 
of industrialization is characteristic of 
most socialist countries， and they have a 
common problem of inefficiency and de-
c1ining economic growth. 
Table 2 shows the composition of 
the industrial sector in detail. In 1989， 
one year before the economic turmoil be-
gan， the following 6 subsectors alone 
occupied 74.4% of total industrial pro-
duction: food 18.8%， textiles 12.0%， 
4 World Bank. World Develotment Report. 1992 
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Table 2: COMPOSITION OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION， at fixed prices (1987) 
Sector 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Power 9.7 11.0 1.2 11.2 11.6 1.7 12.3 13.4 
Fuel 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.9 4.2 3.8 3.6 3.6 
Iron 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.2 1.8 
Nonferrous ores 8.8 13.5 13.0 12.6 12.3 11.4 12.2 11.2 
Construction rriaterials 7.2 7.6 10.1 10.8 10.9 10.6 10.8 5.0 
Wood 10.7 7.9 7.6 7.3 7.0 6.9 6.0 4.2 
Textiles 8.1 11.8 1.6 11.4 10.9 12.0 11.5 10.1 
Clothing 7.0 5.0 4.9 4.6 4.5 4.9 4.7 4.7 
Leather 11.3 9.9 9.1 9.5 9.5 9.6 10.6 14.5 
Print 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 
Glass 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 
Food 23.1 20.3 19.4 19.0 18.7 18.8 18.2 24.0 
Chemicals 3.9 3.2 3.5 3.6 4.1 4.1 4.2 2.1 
Other 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 4.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.。100.0 100.0 100.。100.0 100.0 
Source: Calculated from the data of World Bank and State Statistical Office of Mongolia 
Note:“Other" in 1991 includes 2.1 % of private sector 
Table 3: AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION， at fixed prices (1986) 
Sector 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Gross Production 1746.1 2464.5 2552.5 2468.7 2536.2 2650.7 2551.8 
Crop production 18.3% 33.1 32.0 30.3 30.0 30.3 27.4 
Animal production 81.7% 66.9 68.0 69.7 70.0 69.7 72.6 
Material Inputs 741.1 1116.4 1125.9 1133.0 1168.6 1094.4 1026.2 
Crop production 46.8% 45.1 47.5 50.1 47.9 52.4 50.5 
Animal production 53.2% 54.9 52.5 49.9 52.1 47.6 49.5 
Net Material Product 1004.9 1348.1 1426.6 1335.7 1367.1 1556.3 1525.6 
Crop production -2.7% 23.2 19.7 13.6 14.7 14.7 11.9 
Animal production 102.7% 76.8 80.3 86.4 85.3 85.3 88.1 
Source: Calculated from the data of World Bank 
Note: Gross Production， Material Inputs， Net Material Product (in millions of Tugrik) 
power 11.7%， nonferrous ores 11.4%， 
construction materials 10，9% and leather 
9.6%. The problem in the industrial sec 
tor is not only the concentration in a few 
subsectors， but also the high rate of im-
port content (mor巴 than 50% of in. 
termediate inputs) in the power and non. 
ferrous subsectors， and the rising trend 
of these subsectors in the 1980s. In con. 
trast， among the subsectors with low im 
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port content (less than 10%; food， tex-
tiles and leather) only textiles increased 
the share in industrial production~ There-
fore， industrialization so far pursued in 
creased the import requirement and the 
dependence on external assistance 
In Table 3， the share of crop and 
animal production is shown， along with 
the total agriculture production in gross 
and net value (th巴 latteris gross output 
less material inputs) at fixed prices. In 
the 1980s， the share of crop production 
in gross value rose from 18.3% to 
30.3%， but that of animal production fel 
from 81.7% to 69.7%. This trend， 
however， is not seen for Net Material 
Product because a disproportionally 
large amount of material inputs were 
allocated to crop production (about 50% 
of material inputs for 30% of gross pro-
duction). In 1980， a larger amount of 
material inputs were poured into crop 
production than its gross value， thereby 
making its net material product negative. 
This reflects the government policy 
to expand crop production， more than 
half of which is grains， at the cost of 
stock farming; crop production more than 
doubled (2.5 times)， whereas gross pro-
duction of livestock decreased by 3.4% 
5 These figures are calcu!ated from the State 
Statistica! Ofice of Mongo!ia， Input.Ou~仰tTαble
1987. 
in gross value at fixed prices from 1980 
to 1989 (the sole exception is milk pro-
duction which increased as much as 2.5 
times). In real terms， wheat production 
grew as much as 3.0 times， potatoes 4.1 
times and vegetables 2.3 times， but meat 
production， in contrast， increased only 
slight1y by 5.6% in the same period. 
Livestock increased from 23.8 million 
heads in 1980 to 24.8 million heads in 
1989 (by 3.8%)， but these numbers are 
stil lower than 26.2 million heads in 
1940. 
2. Employment 
As Table 4 shows， 665.8 thousand 
people were employed in 1991， and the 
number has consistently increased in the 
1980s by 2.5% annually. On average， 7 
workers out of 10 were employed in the 
material sector and the remaining 3 in 
the nonmaterial sector. As the share to 
total employment， the former declined 
from 76.0% in 1980 to 71.3% in 1989， 
whereas the latter rose from 24.0% to 
28.7%. If we add transport， communica-
tions， trade and others to the nonmaterial 
sector， we can get the “service sector" 
similar to that in market economies. Such 
a service sector increased its share from 
37.9% to 44.4% in the same period. In 
the longer run， this sector expanded 
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Table 4: EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR (%) 
Sector 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Material 76.0 73.6 73.4 72.8 72.0 71.3 72.0 68.2 
Agriculture 39目7 33.3 32.0 30.9 29.8 29.4 27.4 27.0 
Industry 16.0 18.6 18.0 19.3 19.3 18.9 20.8 18.0 
Construction 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.6 7.9 7.8 
Transport 6.3 6.9 7.5 7.5 7.7 7.4 7.8 6.5 
Communications 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 
Trade 6.4 7.4 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.5 6.5 6.5 
Other 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.2 
-・・・・..........・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・..............................................・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・
Nonmaterial 24.0 26.4 26.6 27.2 28.0 28.7 28.8 31.8 
Housing， municipal services 2.8 3.6 3.6 3.9 3.9 4.2 
Science， R & D 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.2 
Education， culture， art 9.6 10.5 10.4 10.5 11.4 11.8 
Health care， social security 6.3 6.6 6.8 7.1 7.0 7.1 
Banking， finance， insurance 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 
Government 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.1 1.9 
Other 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.。100.0 100.0 100.0 
(thousands) 511.2 561白6 580.9 598.4 616.1 633.2 651.4 665.8 
Source: Caiculated from the data of World Bank and State Statistical Office of Mongolia. 
more drastically from 20.2% in 1960 to 
31.8% in 1970 and 37.9% in 1980， and 
the material sector shrank from 87.0% to 
80.6% and 76.0% in the same period~ 
Agriculture enjoyed the biggest 
share (29.4% in 1989)， but its share has 
declined sharply from 39.7% in 1980 by 
10%. By contrast， the second biggest， in. 
dustry (including mining and manufac. 
turing)， raised its share from 16.0% to 
18.9%; the third biggest， educationl 
culturel art， from 9.6% to 11.8%; and the 
fourth biggest， health care/social secu. 
6 State Statistical Office of the MPR， op. cit.， 1991. 
rity， from 6.3% to 7.1% in the same 
period. In the longer run， these trends 
are more striking: agriculture fel from 
60.8% in 1960 to 47.0% in 1970， indus. 
try rose from 12.1% to 15.5%， educa 
tionl culture/art expanded from 2.8% to 
7.8%， and health care/social security 
from 37%t052%respectively7 
If we compare the composition of 
employment in Table 4 with that of GDP 
in Table 1， the following points become 
apparent. First， the nonmaterial sector 
increased the share of employment from 
7 Ibid. 
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24.0% to 28.7%， but decreased the share 
of GDP from 18.7% to 16.4%， whereas 
the material sector is just the opposite; 
the employment share dec1ined from 
76.0% to 71.3% and the GDP share rose 
from 81.3% to 83.6%. This would sug-
gest that social services provided by the 
nonmaterial sector (especially education 
and health care) have been expanded by 
transfering the resources from the mate‘ 
rial sector (particularly agriculture) in 
order to develop the high level of human 
resources essential to economic develop-
ment. 
Secondly， agriculture employed ab-
out 30% of workers to produce 20% of 
GDP， whereas industry produced more 
than 30% of GDP with less than 20% of 
workers in the 1980s. This contrast in-
dicates lower productivity in agriculture， 
but it also reflects the government policy 
to keep the relative price of agricultural 
products low， thereby promoting indus-
trialization at the cost of agriculture. 
This is apparent if w巴 seethe composi‘ 
tion of investment by sector. As will be 
shown later in Table 6， 30-40% of in-
vestment was allocated to the industrial 
sector and only 15% to the agricultural 
sector in the 1980s. But it is surprising 
that the agricultural sector increased the 
GDP share slightly from 18.6% to 
20.4%， notwithstanding it decreased the 
employment share from 39.7% to 29.4% 
in the 1980s. The absolute number of 
workers in agriculture also decreased 
from 202.7 thousand in 1980 to 186.0 
thousand in 1989. This fact illustrates 
the resilience of agriculture， especially 
the livestock sector. 
Thirdly， the employment share of 
the service sector (communications， 
transport， trade and other) rose from 
13.9% to 16.4% but the GDP share de-
clined from 26.6% to 22.1% in the 
1980s. This stems either from the de-
c1ine in relativ巴 pricesor the dec1ine in 
labor productivity of this sector due to a 
lower level of investment. As Table 6 
shows， the annual investment allocated to 
this sector was 12.1% in 1980 and 
15.5% in 1989， which denies the second 
possibility. Actually labor productivity 
of this sector was relatively high， much 
higher than agriculture and nonmaterial 
sectors. Therefore relative prices of such 
services as transport， commumcations， 
trade， etc.， were decreased in the 1980s， 
reflecting the government attitude toward 
thes巴servlces.
3. Expenditure 
In 1989， just before the external 
shocks caused economic turbulence in 
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Table 5: USES OF NET MATERIAL PRODUCT， atcurrent prices (%) 
Uses 1970 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Personal consumption 57.9 64.6 59.7 65.2 68.2 67.6 62.8 73.0 
Public consumption 12.4 20.8 23.4 27.2 28.1 28.7 25.5 25.9 
Capital accumulatio日 34.1 48.3 55.8 58.0 45.3 41.6 42.1 29.0 
Fixed investment 33.8 53.2 64.1 35.4 45.3 37.7 37.5 10.2 
Change in stocks 5.8 3.1 8.8 8.2 1ー.6 2ー.7 1.6 2.6 
Changes in incomplete project 同5.4 -8.1 17.2 14.4 1.6 6.6 3.1 16.2 
Net exports -4.4 -33.8 38.9 50.4 41.7 -37.9 30.4 -28.0 
Exports 13.6 24.8 30.2 35.4 37.6 34.9 27.1 28.5 
Imports 18.0 58.6 69.1 85.8 79.3 72.8 57.5 56.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.。100.0 
Source: Ca1culated from the data of World Bank 
Note: Imports inc1udes turnkey projects. Statistical discrepancy is not shown here 
Mongolia， private consumption absorbed 
63.8% of GDP， public consumption 
23.2%， and capital accumulation 46.1%. 
Such excessive absorption was financed 
by net imports equivalent to 33.1% of 
GDP~ In the longer run， itis ir叩 ossible
to get the composition of GDP usage， so 
let us employ the data on Net Material 
Product instead. Table 5 indicates the 
uses of NMP at current prices from 
1970 to 1990. Public consumption rose 
from 12.4% in 1970 to 20.8% in 1980 
and 25.5% in 1989， capital accumulation 
rose from 34.1% in 1970 to 48.3% in 
1980， peaked at 58.0% in 1986 and de 
c1ined to 42.1% in 1989. Personal con-
sumption expanded from 57.9% in 1970 
to 64.6% in 1980 and then stagnated to 
8 World Bank， Mongoliα: Co閥均 Econ仰削C
M捌 orandu隅， 1991. 
62，8% in 1989， 
In the 1980s， 40-60% of GDP was 
used for capital accumulation， most of 
which was fixed investment， and it was 
financed by net imports equivalent to 
30-40% of GDP， This high rate of 
domestic investment was comparable 
only to another socialist country (China 
38%) and a highly developed city-state 
(Singapore 37%)， In other Asian coun-
tries， 30% of GDP was spent for invest 
ment in South Korea， 28% in Thailand， 
26% in Malaysia， 22% in Indonesia， 17% 
in the Philippines， 24% in India， 18% in 
Pakistan， 23% in Sri Lanka， 20% in Nep-
al， 12% in Bangladesh and 31 % in Laos 
in 1988: 
The problem is whether such ah 
9 World Bank， Woγld Develotment Reμ付， 1990
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Table 6: COMPOSITION OF INVESTMENT BY INDUSTRY (%) 
Sector 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Material 67.7 65.9 68.8 63.5 66.0 64目4 55.2 63.7 
Industry 40.4 34.2 39目3 30.7 27.5 29.2 27.2 43.2 
Agriculture 13.3 14.5 13.0 13.5 15.4 15.3 10.4 7.1 
Construction 1.9 7.7 2.9 5.2 7.0 4.4 4目5 0.8 
Transport 5.3 6.3 9.4 10.1 12.2 10.7 9.7 8.3 
Communications 5.1 1.9 2.1 1.3 1.1 1.4 0.7 1.4 
Trade 1.7 1.3 2.1 2.7 2.8 3.4 2.7 2.8 
Nonmaterial 32.1 34.0 31.3 36.4 34.1 35.5 44.8 36.3 
??
ょ っ
??
??
? ?
? ? 。???
?????? ??? ，
?
?
?
? ?
?
?? ???
ヮ ?
????
????
? ，
?
?????
?
•••• 
?
? 、
??
?
?
?????っ?ゥ
????
?????
??
?
?
???
???
????????
?
?
?
?
????? ??
? ??
、 。?
，
?
?? ????????? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
? ?
?
Total 
(Million tugrik) 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
3104.0 4633.8 4762.5 4552.2 4536.0 4804.2 3383.9 4033.0 
Generation of electricity 
Petroleum refineries 
(Subsector of Industry J 
????
???
???
??
??
???
。 ，????
?????
•••••• 
?????????????•••• ?
???
?
????
?
? ?
?，??
??
?
??
??
っ ? 。 。
??????
??????? ??
? ?
??????
???
?
?
????
?
??
?????? ? ?
•••• 
?????
...••• 
っ ヮ
????
?
??
?ょっ
?
?
?
???
?????
••• 
? ??
??
Nonferrous metals 
Chemicals 
Building materials 
Textiles 
Food 
[Subtotall 
Source: Calculated from the data of World Bank and State Statistical Office of Mongolia. 
excessive investment was used for pro-
ductive purposes to accelerate a long-
term development for Mongolian economy 
or not. Table 6 indicates the investment 
composition by sector. About two-thirds 
of investment were aUocated for the mate-
rial sector and one-third for the nonmate 
rial sector. In detail， around 30-40% for 
industry， som巴15%for agriculture， another 
15% for service (including transport， 
communications and trade) and about 
20% for housing. In industry， a total of 
20-30% of investment was allocated for 
such basic and modern sectors as genera-
tion of electric energy and heating， petro-
leum refineries， nonferrous metals， che-
micals， and building materials， but a total 
of less than 10% of inv巴stmentwas allo-
cated for such comparative advantage 
sectors as food， textiles， clothing， leather 
& fur， and wood processing. 
Looking at the branch composition 
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of capital stock， the general pictur巴 IS
much the same as the annual investment 
flow above; productive fixed assets com-
prised 63.5% and 62.8% of al fixed 
assets at the end of 1989 and 1991 re 
spectively， whereas nonproductive fixed 
assets were 36.5% and 37.2% respec-
tively. But if we look at the composition 
by kind， the picture becomes totally 
different; building comprised 65.0% and 
70.7% of al fixed assets， whereas power 
and working machines and measuring in-
strument 17.8% and 16.0%， means of 
conveyance 6.5% and 5.9%， productive 
instrument and property 7.4% and 4.5%， 
and working and productive livestock 
3.3% and 2.8% at the end of 1989 and 
1991 respectively. In other words， more 
than 60% of al fixed assets were alo-
cated to such productive sectors as in-
dustry a:nd agriculture， but a lot of build-
ings were iuc1uded in such categories， 
consequently purely productive fixed 
assets might comprise only 30% or less 
In summary， excessive investment so far 
made was not allocated for productive 
uses to accelerate long-term development 
for the Mongolian economy. 
4. Public Finance 
The state budget covers the central 
government and the local governments 
which inc1ude 3 cities (Utaanbaatar， 
Darhan and Erdenet)， 18 aimaks (prefec 
tures) and 351 somons (counties). The 
state budget occupies a very large part 
of the whole economy， and it is of critical 
importance for long-term ec@nomic de-
velopment as well as short-term stabi-
lization. Therefore it will be examined 
here in detail. 
It is common for socialist countries 
to have extremely large public sectors， 
thereby having a large state budget. 
Mongolia is not an exception; the budget-
ary revenue occupied about 50% of GDP 
and the budgetary expenditure some 60% 
in the 1980s. The resultant budget de-
ficits， equivalent to some 10% of GDP， 
was totally financed by foreign loans， 
almost al of which were from the Soviet 
Union. As is shown in Table 7， the de-
ficits increased suddenly from 6.9% in 
1985 to 17.7% in 1986， but this simply 
reflects a change of accounting; until 
1985 the compensation account was 
separated from the government borrow-
ing notwithstanding the former consisted 
of Soviet aid and the export price dif 
ferential， and it is nothing but a form of 
financing government deficits. If we add 
the compensation account to government 
borrowing， we can get the real amount of 
budget deficits， which is shown in the 
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last row of Table 7， and which accounts 
for some 17% of GDP on average in the 
1980s. 
Such huge deficits were fully fi-
nanced by the Soviet Union through con-
cessional loans until 1988， and 90% and 
80% of the deficits were covered by 
loans in 1989 and 1990 respectively， 
thereby resulting in a cumulative debt on 
the Soviet Union of one million rubles at 
the end of 1990. Since the Soviet Union 
itself collapsed in 1991， the cessation of 
Soviet aid forced Mongolia to finance the 
fiscal deficits by herself. But with a 
sharp decline of economic activity， tax 
revenue decreased， state expenditures 
tended to expand， and the deficits grew. 
Consequently， the government resorted to 
domestic borrowing from the central 
bank with a resu1tant increase in credit 
supply. The expansion of money supply 
caused a rise in inflation， causing a re-
duction in the people's standard of liv 
mg. 
Table 7: STATE BUDGET as percentage of GDP (%) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Total Revenue 51.1 50.1 51.0 51.1 52.0 52.5 46.8 46.8 45.4 48.9 50.9 
Total Expenditure 59.1 55.8 56.3 56.9 58.3 59.3 64.5 65.5 65.0 65.3 64.4 
Overall Balance 7.9 5.7 5.4 -5.9 -6.3 -6.9 -17.7 -18.7 -19.5 -16.5 -13.5 
Government Borrowing (1) 7.9 5.7 5.4 5.9 6.3 6.9 17.7 18.7 19.5 16.5 13.5 
Domestic -0.4 1.3 -0.9 0.3 -0.5 0.4 -0.6 0.3 0.1 1.5 ー0.9
Foreign 8.4 7.1 6.3 6.2 6.8 7.3 18.3 19.1 19.6 15.0 14.4 
Compensation Account (2) 7.2 8.8 9.9 10.6 11.4 11.4 
Soviet Aid 6.3 7.2 7.6 7.6 7.9 8.1 
Export Price Differential 1.0 1.6 2.4 3.0 3.5 3.3 
※Real Deficits=(l)十(2) 15.2 14.5 15.3 16.5 17.6 18.2 17.7 18.7 19.5 16.5 13.5 
Source: Calculated from the data of World Bank 
Table 8: COMPOSITION OF STATE BUDGET REVENUE (%) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Total Revenue 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.。
(Local Government) 30.8 28.6 27.6 28.1 29.8 2.1 33.3 33.1 43.4 48.6 34.2 
Tax Revenue 90.5 91.3 91.3 92.0 91.8 91.2 90.4 89.7 90.6 90.9 82.4 
Turnover Taxes 60.6 61.2 59.0 58.8 57.7 55.6 51.9 50.0 48.0 46.0 43.4 
Import price differential 43.5 42.6 39.0 37.3 35.7 35.5 35.5 34.6 33.6 33.2 29.5 
Domestic turnover taxes 17.1 18.6 20.0 21.6 22.0 20.2 16.4 15.4 14.4 12.8 14.0 
Profit Taxes 28.1 28.4 30.9 31.8 32.8 34.3 36.9 38.2 41.0 43.4 37.8 
Nontax Revenue 9.5 8.7 8.7 8.0 8.2 8.8 9.7 10.3 9.4 9.1 17.6 
Source: Calculated from the data of World Bank 
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State revenue consists of tax and 
nontax revenue_ As Table 8 shows， tax 
revenue accounted for about 90% of total 
revenue， and nontax revenue， most of 
which was social security and payroll 
taxes， accounted for the remaining 10% 
in the 1980s_ The main sources of tax 
revenue were turnover taxes and profits 
taxes; the former dec1ined in share fr-om 
60.6% in 1980 to 46.0% in 1989， 
whereas the latter rose from 28.1% to 
43.4%. Profits taxes are levied on state 
enterprises and cooperatives who are 
making profits; profits are defined as the 
difference between gross sales revenue 
and production costs (the latter inc1udes 
turnover taxes on inputs， depreciation 
and production taxes). Loss-making en-
terprises are exempt from profits taxes 
and receive financial support from the 
government， so it should be noted that 
the pure transfer to the government is 
smaller than the table shows. 
Turnover taxes comprise import 
price differential and domestic turnover 
taxes; the former reduced in share from 
43.5% in 1980 to 33.2% in 1989， 
whereas the latter increased from 17.1% 
in 1980 to 22.0% in 1984 and dec1ined 
to 12.8% in 1989. Import phce differen-
tial represented the difference between 
the import contract price and the domes-
tic w.holesale price of the imported goods， 
which was transfered to the budget re-
venue， but from 1991 it was replaced by 
an uniform tariff of 15%. Domestic tur-
nover taxes are levied on such public 
utilities as electricity and water supply， 
and on such domestically produced goods 
as vodka， beer and adult footwear; 
among them vodka contributed some 70% 
of al domestic turnover taxes. 
State expenditures consist of current 
and capital expenditures; the former 
absorbed about 80% of the total budget 
(or 50% of GDP)， though the share fel 
from 83.7% in 1980 to 76.8% in 1989 
(see Table 9). The biggest item of curr巴nt
expenditure was “social and cultural" ex-
penses absorbing about 35% of the total 
expenditure or more than 20% of GDP. 
This covers such expenditures as educa-
tion， science， culture， health and social 
security， and comprises pensions， social 
security payments， free food and medi 
cine， subsidies and transfers to house 
holds and public establishments. The 
second biggest item (30%) is“national 
development" expenditure， which inc1ude 
interest payments and purchases of 
goods and services for expanding mate-
rial production (export subsidies were 
also inc1uded until 1990).“Administra 
tion and defense" is the third largest 
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Table 9: COMPOSITION OF STATE BUDGET EXPENDITURE (%) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Total Expenditure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100. 
(Local Government) 38.2 37.2 35.2 34.6 35.6 35.4 40.3 44.1 47.0 49.1 49目9
Current Expenditures 83.7 86.2 85.7 84.1 85目2 83.2 81.2 79.7 77.4 76.8 81.1 
National Development 30.2 30.2 33.3 33.2 34.6 33.2 32.0 31.0 28.6 29.8 31.2 
Social and Cultural 37.5 38.9 37.3 36.5 36.3 36.0 34.9 35.0 35.5 34.9 38.7 
Administration and Defense 14.6 15.2 13.9 13.3 13.2 12.8 13.2 12.5 12.2 11.1 10.1 
(Wages and Salaries) 17.1 17.8 16.2 16.0 16.1 16.0 15.0 14.2 14.3 13.9 13.4 
(Subsidies and Transfers) na na na na na na 41.6 39.0 36.1 37.9 38.6 
Investment 16.3 13.8 14.3 16.0 14.8 16.8 18.8 20.3 22.6 23.3 18.9 
Material Sectors 5.6 4.1 4.3 5目1 4.8 5.7 7.9 8.3 10.4 11.2 12.8 
Nonmaterial Sectors 10.7 9.8 10.1 10.9 10.0 11.1 11.0 12.0 12.2 12.0 6.1 
Source: Calculated from the data of World Bank. 
Note: na = not available 
[Mill問 lSof dollars) 
Table 10: THE CONSOLlDATED BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Trade balance 
Exports 
Imports 
Turnkey projects 
Services balance 
Unrequired transfers 
Current account 
Capital account 
Overall balance 
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'Real Trade balance 
Export!import ratio (%) 
'Export!import ratio (%) 
Barter trade rate (%) 
Exports 
Imports 
-459.5 -798.8 -1098.0 -1010.5 -1020.6 -1117.8 -582.9 
59.46 56.50 55.78 60.11 56.87 51.69 59.52 
46.69 41.51 40.29 44.70 44.82 41.59 44.54 
96.42 94.69 95.13 94.61 93.38 90.59 91.37 
97.30 97.75 97目42 96.56 96.77 95.53 85.65 
Source: Calculated from the data of World Bank 
Note ・RealTrade balance is the sum of trade balance and turnkey projects目
'Exportlimport ratio is the percentage of exports divided by imports and turnkey projects. 
item， and it declined slightly from 14.6% 
in 1980 to 11.1% in 1989. 
they absorbed more than 50% of total 
expenditure in the second half of the 
1980s. The former reduced the share “Wages and salaries" and “subsidies 
and transfers" are different classifi-ca- from 17.1% in 1980 to 13.9% in 1989， 
tions from those above， and together but it would be extremely difficult to re-
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duc巴 further.The latter accounted for 
about 40% of the total expenditure be-
tween 1986 and 1989， and this is a 
category that is to be reduced in order to 
improve the fiscal situation_ 
5_ Balance of Payments and 
External Trade 
As we have seen， Mongolian foreign-
trade was characterized by chronic de-
ficits equivalent to 30-50% of net mate-
rial product As Table 10 indicates， the 
trade balance was consistently in deficit 
through the 1980s， and the amount rose 
from $274.4 million in 1980 to $743_8 
million in 1989_ But as turnkey projects 
aided by the Soviet Union were nothing 
but imports of merchandise and services， 
the real trade balance， which includes 
turnkey projects， was also in deficit， and 
the amount was much greater; $459_5 
million in 1980 and $111 7 _ 8 million in 
1989 (about 34% of GDP ca1culated on 
official， overvalued exchange rates)_ Cur-
rent balance was also in deficit every 
year through the 1980s， and was fi-
nanced by an equally large amount of 
capital inflow， mainly from the Soviet 
Union~ 
The export/import ratio shows that 
only 60% of imports were possible by 
exporting the Mongolian products， and 
this ratio falls well below 50% if turn-
key projects are included in imports_ The 
barter trade rates were much higher 
than 90%， and these rates also indicate 
the trade with the Soviet Union_ Another 
characteristic of Mongolia's foreign trade 
is the high rates of export and import de-
pendence; exports and imports accounted 
for 24% and 58% of GDP in 1989 re-
spectively_ The extraordinarily high rate 
of trade dependence， of trade partner 
concentration and of aid dependence 
made the Mongolian economy extremely 
vulnerable to such external economic 
shocks as the breakdown of the Soviet 
economy and the CMEA trade system in 
1991_ 
Another factor made the economy 
more vulnerable and the recent economic 
situation worse in Mongolia; the concen-
tration of exports on primary goods and 
the concentration of imports on indis-
pensable inputs for production_ As Table 
11 shows， about 40% of exports were 
“fuel， mineral and metals"， most of which 
were copper concentrate， 30% were “raw 
materials" and 10% were “food" in the 
second half of 1980s_“Other consum~r 
goods" accounted for 15%， most of which 
were products of wool， cashmere， skin 
and leather. Thus most exports were 
primary goods and their products， whose 
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Table 11: COMPOSITION OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS (%) 
1980 1985 
[Exports] 100.0 100.0 
Capital goods 0.3 0.2 
Fuels， mineral and metals 26.4 42.2 
Chemical fertilizer and rubber 0.0 0.0 
Building materials and elements 0.4 0.6 
Raw materials for food ind ustry 13.4 6.1 
Other raw materials 30.9 24.6 
Food 19.0 9.4 
Other consumer goods 9.5 16.8 
[Impo巾] 100.0 100.0 
Capital goods 33.1 36.3 
Fuels， mineral and metals 24.1 28.7 
Chemical fertilizer and rubber 6.3 5.9 
Building materials and elements 1.9 1.4 
Raw materials for food ind ustry 2.9 1.4 
Other raw materials 2目4 2.8 
Food 8.5 6.3 
Other consumer goods 21.0 17.2 
Source: Calculated from the data of World Bank 
elasticities of demand were low. The low 
elasticities tend to handicap an economy; 
the lower the price elasticity of demand， 
the less the effectiveness of currency de-
valuation; the lower the income elasticity 
of demand， the more likely the terms of 
trade worsen， and so the巴xportearnings 
tend to dec1ine in the long run. Mongolia 
has to increase the export of manufac-
tured goods whose elasticities are high 
enough to overcome such a handicap. 
On the import side， about 30% were 
“capital goods" such as machinery and 
vehic1es， another 30% were “fuel， miner 
al and metals"， most of which were 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
40.1 39.4 41.7 42.8 48.1 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 
4.0 4.5 3.4 4.0 3.9 
9.4 7.6 8.1 6.5 5.3 
20.1 22.0 22.8 20.5 15.5 
11.0 10.6 8.1 8.7 6.6 
15.4 15.8 15.7 17.5 20.1 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
36.1 32.2 30.2 29.6 31.1 
28.4 30目8 33.5 27.3 27.2 
5.4 6.1 5.6 6.3 5.3 
1.3 1.9 1.4 2.3 1.9 
1.0 1.3 0.1 0.8 0.3 
2.3 2.5 3.3 4.0 3.8 
6.2 6.5 7.2 7.7 8.8 
19.1 18.4 18.5 21.9 21.6 
gasoline， 6% were “chemical fertilizer 
and rubber" and 20% were “other con 
sumer goods" like household appliances. 
This means that two-thirds of the im 
ports (the former three categories) were 
inputs indispensable for domestic pro-
duction， so that even a temporary cessa-
tion of their supply would cause a se-
rious reduction in economic activities as 
actually happened in recent years. These 
imported inputs have price elasticities so 
low that the devaluation of tugrik would 
increase the amount of exports necessary 
to import the same quantity before the 
devaluation， so that the devaluation 
~Ij flj % 
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tends to be ineffective or simply de-
trimentaL In addition， since the income 
elasticities of machinery， vehic1es， gaso 
line and electric appliances are high， im-
ports tend to increase rapidly， causing 
deterioration of the balance of payments 
as the Mongolian economy begins to de-
velop again. In this situation， some im-
port substitution must be consider巴d.
m. ECONOMIC REFORM 
Mongolia embarked upon a broad 
economic reform in 1990， when the first 
democratic election was executed after 
70 years under a socialist regime. This 
fundamental change of economic regime 
was brought about by an economic crisis 
in Mongolia caused by the recent col-
lapse of the Soviet economy and the 
CMEA system. The cause of the present 
economic crisis will be summarized in 
section 1; developments of economic re-
form will be reviewed briefly in section 
2; and the major problems of the reform 
will be examined in section 3. 
1. Background of Economic Crisis 
As we have so far seen， the Mongo-
lian economy had been so dependent on 
the CMEA system in general and Soviet 
assistance in particular， that the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the CMEA sys-
tem in 1991 has brought about an over-
al disorder in economic activiti巴s，there-
by making it difficult to satisfy the mini 
mum needs of the Mongolian people. 
But the deeline in GDP was re司
corded before 1991: -2.1% in 1990 and 
9.2% in 1991. What can explain this 
negative growth in 1990? Until 1988， 
Mongolia's fiscal deficits were fully fi-
nanced by Soviet aid. But as economic 
reform was initiated in the Soviet Union 
in 1987， her economy fel into confusion 
and the government faced the protlem of 
rapidly growing fiscal deficits in 1988， 
as much as 80 billion rubles (about 11% 
of her GDP). As a consequence， only 90% 
of the budget deficits of Mongolia were 
financed by the Soviet Union in 1989. 
This 10% cut in foreign finance had 
a strong deflationary effect to Mongolia; 
foreign borrowing dropped from 19.5% 
of GDP in 1988 to 15.0% in 1989; tax 
revenue， mainly profits tax， was in 
creased from 41.2% of GDP to 44.4% for 
financing budget deficits. In 1990， only 
80% of the budget deficits were financed 
by the Soviet Union， nontax revenue 
(mainly fees obtained from cooperatives 
and state enterprises) was increased 
from 4.5% of GDP to 8.9% with a resul 
tant deflationary effect on GDP. As ex 
plained ，earlier， Soviet aid has been com-
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pletely terminated from 1991 to date， 
and this caused a sharp drop in GDP of 
9.2% in 1991 with a cumulative effect 
since 1989. 
More specifical1y， the sharp dec1ine 
of production was caused by the even 
deeper cut in such indispensable imports 
as gasoline， spare parts and basic mate-
rials， approximately 80% of which were 
from the Soviet Union. Total imports fel1 
by 50% in 1990， 43% in 1991， and 16% 
in the first seven months of 1992 com-
pared with the same period of the pre-
vious year. Fuel imports in the first 
seven mon ths of 1992 shrank to one-
third of the same period of 1991:日
Gross agricultural production de-
c1ined by 3.7% in 1990 and 7.6% in 
1991， but a slight rise (1.6% in 1990) 
and drop (0.5% in 1991) in livestock 
output concealed a substantial reduction 
in crops (12.7% and 25.8% respectively) 
A contrast is apparent here: the livestock 
sector is self-sufficient and hence resi 
lient to external shocks， while the crop 
sector is fragile because of its high de-
pendence on external inputs. 
lndustrial production decreased by 
5.7% in 1990， 20% in 1991 and another 
20% in the first seven months of 1992. 
10 UNDP. Mongol叫 :NewO門entationfor Nationαl 
Develotment. 1992. 
But the effects were not equal among in 
dustries: gross product of building mate-
rial industry fel1 by 63.4% in 1991， che-
mical industry by 61.5%， engineering 
and metal-working industry by 57.8%， 
wood processing industry by 46.2%， 
glass and faience industry by 34.1%， tex-
tile industry by 32.0%， non-ferrous met 
al industry by 29.2%， fuel industry by 
22.7%， c10thing industry by 22.1%， 
printing industry by 19.8%， electric and 
thermal energy industry by 15.8%， but 
gross product of food industry， and 
leather， fur & shoe industry increased by 
20.0%and 44%respectively!1 
The overal1 dec1ine in economic 
activity reduced exports substantially: 
41% in 1990 and 22% in 1991. A slight 
rise in exports is expected in 1992， but 
the soft market for Mongolia's traditional 
exports， copper concentrate， has set back 
the export recovery. The external trade 
with the Soviet Union had been settled in 
terms of transferable ruble， but it was 
changed to convertible currency since 
1990. This made Mongolia's foreign ex-
change reserves negative and caused the 
current economic crisis. Now the 
emergency assistance only makes it 
possible to import the minimum require-
11 Ibid. 
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ments for the Mongolian people. 
Such a decline in economic activity 
has given rise to a significant increase in 
unemployment: 55.4 thousand or some 
8% of workers were unemployed at the 
end of 1991. The unemployment problem 
is more serious in urban areas: the rate 
of unemployment is expected to become 
as high as 16% in urban districts and 
one-third of the total unemployed are 
registered in such citi巴sas Ulaanbaatar， 
Darhan and Erdenet in 1991. In addi-
tion， more workers are underemployed 
and earn insufficient income for normal 
12 
life， a problem which is increasing:-Un-
employment and underemployment prob-
lems are thus brewing social unrest， 
which in turn may cause political insta-
bility in the future 
A substantial fal in production has 
caused hyper-inflation as a result of a 
lack of goods and services. If we com-
pare the level of production of some 
basic necessities in the first half of 1992 
with that of 1990， electricity fel by 
20%， meat and dairy products by 50% 
and wheat flour by 15%. As a result， the 
consumer price index rose to 377 in 
September 1992 as compared with Janu-
ary 1991 when most prices had been 
12 Ibid 
liberalized. But the disaggregated price 
indices were quite different: housing 
goods 599， clothes and shoes 405， food 
stuffs 398， transport and communica-
tions 219， medicine 197， rent and ener-
13 
gy 162:- Thus the price of social ser 
vices rose relatively slowly， but it has 
b巴comeincreasingly difficult to get such 
14 
services recently: 
Another cause of the recent inflation 
i!;i a 、rapid increase in money supply 
through an expansion of domestic credit. 
Up to 1990， almost al governm巴ntde-
ficits equivalent to 17% or so of GDP 
have been financed through Soviet aid， 
but after 1991 when the Soviet economy 
collapsed and external assistance ceased， 
the Mongolian government had no choice 
but to resort to a huge sum of borrowing 
from the central bank. As a result， 
money supply expanded drastically with 
a natural consequence of inflation: M-1 
and M-2 increased by 54% and 77% re司
spectively from January 1991 to January 
1992; by 122% and 147% respectively 
from January 1991to September 1992!5 
13 Bank of Mongolia. 
14 According to UNDP， op. cit.，“in the last four 
months of 1991， inflation averaged 7% a month 
and is estimated to have been 120% for the 
year as a whole. However， the monthly inflation 
rate has increased in 1992， with an average of 
14% for the first seven months." 
15 Bank of Mongolia. 
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In summary， as the Soviet aid was 
cut in 1989 and 1990， the Mongolian 
government had to increase the tax and 
nontax revenue to make up the deficit 
and it had a strong deflationary effect on 
her economy. But the real shock came in 
1991， when the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the CMEA system caused a 
sharp cut in imports of Mongolia with a 
resultant decline in domestic production， 
which in turn brought about hyper infla司
tion and unemployment problems as well 
as a serious drop in exports. The drop in 
exports led to a further cut in imports 
and a vicious circle set in: a lack of 
necessary imports reduced the domestic 
production even further which included 
the production for exports. The aid-de-
pendence of Mongolian economy exacer 
bated the situation: the terminated assist-
ance meant a substantial cut in imports， 
which in turn caused a shrink in produc-
tion and in exports; huge public deficits 
became financed by government borrow-
ing from the central bank in place of ex-
ternal assistance from the Soviet Union， 
thereby aggravating inflation through a 
sharp increase in money supply 
2. Developments of Economic Reforms 
Every economic activity， including 
agriculture， was under the control of the 
state and central planners in Mongolia 
since the 1930s. In the middle of the 
1980s， stimulated by P巴restroikain the 
Soviet Union， Mongolia set out in some 
economic reforms， but its objective was 
limited to improving the efficiency of the 
traditional command economy. The real 
step towards economic reform was taken 
in September 1990 when the first demo-
cratic election was executed and a new 
coalition government was formed， which 
pledged to construct a market oriented 
economy. 
The economic reforms are classifi巴d
into five categories: price liberalization， 
privatization of state enterprises， finan-
cial sector reform， fiscal reform and ex-
ternal sector reforms. In this section， we 
will review the recent developments of 
these economic reforms and examine the 
major problems in the next section. 
(1) Price Liberalization 
The Mongolian government has 
liberalized prices in accordance with the 
agreement reached with the IMF. In the 
beginning of 1991， goods and services 
under state control accounted for some 
40% in sales value. This figure fel to 
20% by September 1991 and to 10% by 
July 1992. By the end of 1992， al 
prices and tariffs are to be liberalized， 
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but sorne of thern will rernain under state 
control. 
As of March 1992， only prices of 
the nine categories rernain under state 
control: petroleurn and diesel fuel， tele-
phone calls， housing and wat巴rcharges， 
electricity and heating， public transport， 
flour， ordinary bread， coal and firewood 
for heating， and rnedicine. Farrngate 
prices for agricultural products have 
been liberalized， but sorne of thern (live 
anirnals， rneat， wool， cashrnere， grain， 
potatoes， veg巴tables，rnilk， sour crearn 
and eggs) rernain under the state order 
syst巴rnto ensure the provision of essen-
tial food supplies to the population， to in-
crease exports， and to create state re-
serves. 
Alrnost al retail prices were dou-
bled with the sarne， sirnu1taneous in-
crease in wages and salaries in January 
1991. Wholesale prices and farrngate 
prices were raised sirnultaneously but by 
less than 100%. Since then， factor prices 
also were liberalized. Wages and salar-
ies， in particular， becarne freely deter-
rnined by private enterprises， and they 
usually increased rnuch higher than infla-
tion. But wage increases in the public 
sector were kept below the inflation rate 
to prevent a wage-price spiral， resulting 
in a wage differential between workers 
in private and public sectors 
Thus a price structure which had 
the sarne characteristics of rnost socialist 
countries was totally changed: low ener 
gy prices， subsidized cheap food and 
housing， free social services， cheap capit-
al goods， very expensive consurner goods 
(especially， irnported consurner goods)， 
and low wages and salaries were 
changed to becorne sirnilar to internation 
al levels. 
(2) Privatization 
The privatization process is under 
way not only in the industrial sector but 
also in the agricultural and service sec-
tors. This process was initiated by the 
new law on cooperation in 1988， which 
promoted private sector cooperatives. In 
1990， restrictions on private ownership 
of herds were elirninated， and finally in 
1991 the Privatization Law was passed 
by the Parliarnent and the prograrn for 
privatization was initiated. 
In the first six rnonths of 1992， the 
private sector was estimated to produce 
about 50% of agricultural output and 
15% of gross industrial output~6 Accord 
ing to the data of State Statistical Office 
of Mongolia， the nurnber of establish-
16 UNDP. op. cit 
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ments substantially changed between 
April 1991 and June 1992: state and 
public enterprises and organizations 
occupied 54.5%， cooperatives 30.3% and 
private individual enterprises 15.2% in 
1991; in 1992 the former two fel to 
13.7% and 22.2% respectively， while the 
latter rose sharply to 61.9% 
In the agricultural sector， 22 
thousand families have become private 
owners， and over 60% of livestock has 
been transferred to private ownership in 
1991. In place of former agricultural 
cooperatives， 227 share-holding com-
pani巴s，and 58 limited companies and 
cooperati ves have been established: 7 As 
a result， the share of livestock numbers 
changed drastically between 1989 and 
1991: state organization， including state 
farms， dropped the share of ownership 
slightly from 8.5% to 7.9%， cooperatives 
declined sharply from 63.8% to 37.9%， 
and the private sector almost doubled 
from 27.7% to 54.9%. 
When state farms are privatiz巴d，
their assets such as agricultural equip-
ment and herds are to be distributed to 
each farmer according to the number of 
vouchers he or she owns. The vouchers 
are given equally and free of charge to 
17 Ibid 
each citizen， including children， so the 
number of vouchers is proportional to 
family size. If the farmer gets the 
vouchers， say from his relatives or 
friends， he can get more assets previous-
ly owned by state farms. Most privatiza-
tion， however， isnot for the agricultural 
sector. At the end of 1990， the industrial 
sector had 51.6% of productive fixed 
assets of the national economy， and the 
agricultural sector only 20.4%. 
According to the government prog-
ram， approximately 60% of the country's 
fixed assets amounting to some 24 bil-
lion tugriks are to be privatized. Out of 
these， 18 billion tugriks of assets are 
under “large" privatization， which in-
cludes some 500 large state-owned enter-
prises to be privatized. Under “small" 
privatization 6 billion tugriks of assets， 
or about 3.4 thousand economic units， 
are to be privatized. For the period from 
June 1991 to July 1992， over 50% of 
assets under large privatization and 
around 70% of assets under small priva-
18 
tization have been privatized:~ Some 
large enterprises are scheduled to remain 
in state ownership: mining， energy， rail 
and air transportation， communications 
and water supply. 
18 Ibid. 
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In most cases， when state-owned en-
terprises are privatized， they are sold to 
the workers of those enterprises. They 
have to satisfy certain conditions in 
order to get them， otherwise the enter-
prises are to be sold by auction to other 
persons who can afford them. The condi-
tions are (1) to collect the vouchers 
equivalent to the value of the enter-
prise's assets estimated by the State Pri-
vatization Commission; (2) to have the 
consent of al workers in the enterprise; 
and (3) to demonstrate to the commission 
that they have a well-designed manage-
ment plan for the future. 
The privatization process is thus 
difficult， but their future is expected to 
be more difficult since about 60% of 
state-owned enterprises have been in de-
ficit. Their deficits were so far financed 
by the government through subsidies， but 
loss-making enterprises must go bank-
rupt after privatization. 
(3) Public Finance Reform 
As mentioned earlier， the govern-
ment has run deficits as high as 17% of 
GDP， almost al of which were financed 
by Soviet assistance until 1990. When 
the Soviet Union collapsed and the 
assistance terminated in 1991， itbecame 
necessary for the Mongolian government 
to reform h巴rfiscal system. The first 
step was taken in January 1991 when 
the tax system was restructured. Before 
tax reform， profits taxes， import price 
differentials and domestic turnover taxes 
averaged around 40%， 35% and 15% re-
spectively of total revenues in the second 
half of the 1980s. These taxes were re-
placed by corporate and personal income 
taxes， customs duties at a uniform 15% 
rate， and more broadly based sales taxes 
respectively. In September 1991， addi-
tional measures were introduced to sup-
plement the new revenue sources: an in-
crease in customs duties to 25%， the 
doubling of sales taxes on liquor， tobacco 
and gold， and automatic payroll deduc-
tions of social security payments. 
On the expenditure side， some gov-
ernment ministries were already 
rationalized in 1987 and 1990 to reduce 
the current expenditure， which accounted 
for about 80% of total expenditures， but 
it was not very effective. Then the ex-
penses for national development and 
capital investment were cut drastically: 
their shares in GDP declined from 20.0% 
in 1990 to 10.0% in 1991， and from 
12.1% to 5.3% respectively. Subsidies 
and transfers accounted for about half of 
current expenditure， though most of them 
were distributed to the national develop-
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Table 12: COMPOSITION OF TRANSFERS TO PUBLlC ENTERPRISES AND SUBSIDlES by sector (%) 
1986 1987 
Total Transfers and Subsidies 100.00 100.00 
Agriculture 29.39 31.15 
Industry 14.22 15.90 
Constructio日 3.06 1.53 
Transport 1.69 1.79 
Trade 35.08 31.77 
Housing 4.10 4.38 
Other services 12.46 13.47 
Source: Calculated from the data of World Bank 
Note: Data in 1991 is budget. 
ment expenditures. They were sharply 
cut in 1991 and their share in GDP 
dropped from 16.2% in 1990 to 5.8% in 
1991. 
The sectoral distribution of trans-
fers and subsidies is shown in Table 12. 
All items were reduced in real terms， but 
the reduction was not even by sector: 
trade and agricultural sectors together 
accounted for more than half of the total 
until 1990， but they became almost null 
as export subsidies and farmgate price 
subsidies were eliminated in 1991; the 
industrial sector received 55.8% of the 
total subsidy in 1991， most of which 
was for electric and heating energy pro-
duction; other services received 31.0% in 
1991， which comprised geologic research 
and veterinary services. Social security 
payments are not listed in this table， but 
they reached 21.2% of total expenditures 
in 1991. almost double the share in 
1988 1989 1990 1991 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
28.25 28.61 31.11 2.75 
18.74 19.36 26.33 55.81 
1.11 0.90 1.05 1.65 
2.06 1.32 1.86 2.32 
28.98 27.22 20.43 0.00 
7.29 9.85 5.99 6.52 
13.56 12.75 13.22 30.96 
1990. 
By these attempts to reduce national 
expenditures， their share in GDP de-
creased from 64.2% in 1990 to 47.2% in 
1991. Yet the share of national revenue 
in GDP also dropped from 50.7% to 
32.1 % in the same period resulting in a 
rising share of fiscal deficits from 13.5% 
to 15.1 %. This decrease in budget r巴田
venue arose from two elements inherent 
in the transitional period. First， a low 
level of general econo'mic activities， 
which was caused by the recent econo-
mic turmoil， resulted in a low level of tax 
revenues. Second， new tax sources did 
not generate the expected amount of re-
venue for lack of an effective tax admi-
nistration for new taxes， while the tradi-
tional sources of revenue were already 
abolished. The newly introduced customs 
duties， in particular， were expected to 
generate about 20% of total revenues， 
 ~Ij tlJ ~ 
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but yielded only 4_9% in 1991 due to 
long lines at the border and an ineffec 
tive tax administration_ It will take much 
time to stabilize the economy and to 
overcome such problems in the tran 
sitional period， so external assistance 
will be necessary for the time being_ 
According to The Action Program of 
the Mongoli仰 Governm仰 t，1992， further 
reforms are scheduled to improve th巴
present fiscal condition_ The tax law 
adopted in 1991 wi1 be abolished and 
the new tax law wi1 be estab!ished in 
1993_ The existing tax law has charged 
enterprises the corporate taxes on net re-
venue at six different rates， between 8% 
and 46%， depending on their size_ The 
new tax law will stipulate a unified or 
two rate tax on total profits (with depre-
ciation and labor costs now deducted)_ 
Tax deductions given to state enterprises 
and individuals wil1 be reduced signifi-
cantly_ The new sales tax wil1 be im-
posed on goods dir巴ctlyand the number 
of items covered by the law will be in-
creased_ Taxes are to be levied on im 
movable property_ Budgetary subsidies 
to the ful1y or partly state-owned enter-
prises wi1l be cut drastical1y from 1993 
and completely stopped thereafter. On 
the other hand， tax exemptions will be 
granted to such economic entities that 
contribute to the improvement of food 
supply or to the growth of exports by 
producing internationally competitive 
goods using advanced technology_ 
(4) Financial Reform 
Until May 1991， when the new 
Banking Law became effective， there had 
been only one bank， the State Bank， 
which performed both central and com-
mercial banking functions_ The State 
Bank was then divided into a central 
bank (the Bank of Mongolia) and a fore 
ign trade bank (the State Bank of Mongo 
lia)_ From November 1991， commercial 
banking functions were transfered to 
seven newly established commercial 
banks: Investment and Technological In-
novation Bank， Mongolian Cooperation 
Bank， Transportation Bank， the Insur-
ance Bank， Agricultural Bank， Industrial 
Bank and Public Bank of Mongolia 
The central bank has tightened 
monetary and credit policies in order to 
contain inflation which was caused by 
price liberalization in January 199 L The 
major tool of monetary policy was mini-
mum cash reserve requirements for com-
mercial banks which were increased 
from 8. 5% to 40% in 1992_ The interest 
rate on central bank loans to commercial 
banks has been gradually increased， first 
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to 30% in April 1992， then to 35-60% 
in August and to 120% in SeptembeL 
However， these policies have limited 
effects on inflation because the interest 
rates set before the new banking law are 
held low and because the banks stil hold 
a huge amount of loans made to the loss-
making state enterprises. 
The new banking law stipulates that 
al commercial banks enjoy the right to 
set interest rates according to their own 
policies and collect commissions for 
money deposits and credits as well as 
establishing their own exchange rates for 
purchase and sale of foreign exchange to 
the non-bank public， and that three com-
mercial banks have the right to carry out 
international foreign exchange trans-
19 
actions:-But the actual extent of their 
own discretion is yet unknown. 
(5) External Sector Reforms 
Mongolia's external economic rela-
tions had been almost limited to the 
CMEA countries， but the government 
opened up her economy to western coun-
tries in 1990 when the first democratic 
election was conducted and the transition 
to a market-oriented economy was de-
clared. Since then， Mongolia has opted 
19 Ibid. 
for steering a course toward market 
relations and conducting an open-door 
foreign policy. At present， Mongolia is a 
member country of the World Bank 
Group (IBRD， IDA and IFC)， the Asian 
Development Bank and the IMF， and is 
applying for membership in GATT. The 
open-door policy is particularly impor-
tant in Mongolia where technology trans-
fer is necessary through foreign invest田
ments and external trade. In addition， it
is the most effective way to cope with the 
difficult problem of domestic monopoly. 
Up to 1989， when the monopoly of 
state trading corporations was elimin-， 
ated， external trade had been handled 
solely by five foreign trade corporations 
and the large state-owned enterprises. In 
1991， direct export rights were granted 
to selected manufacturers and foreign 
trading rights were issued on a non-dis-
criminatory basis to private and public 
enterprises. Almost al export restric-
tions have been lifted; only the items 
connected to environmental protection 
and a few kinds of raw materials stil 
need a licence today. However， only 5% 
of exports were provided by the private 
sector in 1992 since the main export 
oriented enterprises are stil state-owned. 
Some 80% of imports and exports are 
barter trade with the ex-Soviet Union， 
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and the barter trade is stil under the 
state order systern. The governrnent 
plans to abolish the state order systern 
and the irnport licence in the near future. 
The state-owned enterprises， which 
exported 95% of total exports in 1992， 
had to surrender their foreign exchange 
earnings at the official rate unti1 1989， 
but thereafter they can retain part of 
thern and sel thern in a free rnarket. 
Foreign exchange earned above state 
orders and earned by private exporters 
can be retained in full. The exchange 
rate was T3 =事1unti1 June 1990， but 
was devaluated to T5.6， then to T7.1 in 
May 1991. The foreign exchange regirne 
was changed to the present three-rnarket 
structure in June 1991: the cornrnercial 
rate was revaluated to T40=$1， the rate 
for barter trade was kept T7.1 = $1， and 
the free rnarket rate ranged between 
T100-T150 = $1 in 1991. The cornrner-
cial rate was devaluated again to T150 
=事1in January 1993， but the prevailing 
rnarket rate was between T250-T300 = 
$1 at that tirne. Hence the official rate is 
stil overvalued. The rate rnay be devalu-
ated again in the near future because it 
failed to achieve the target agreed with 
the IMF， which is to keep the differential 
between the official and rnarket rates to 
less than T90 per dollar. 
When Mongolia opened up her eco-
norny to the world in 1990， the Foreign 
Investrnent Law was enacted. Since then， 
foreign investrnent has been a priority 
for the governrnent， but the law has not 
been effective enough to attract rnany 
foreign investors. As rnany as 149 eco-
nornic units had been established as joint 
venture by July 1992， but only 34 eco-
nornic units started their business activi 
ties (15 in industry， 10 in service， 6 in 
trade， 2 in public catering and 1 in con-
struction). Out of 149 joint venture eco-
nornic units， 75are with the ex-Soviet 
Union， 31 with China， 5 with East Euro 
pean countries， and only 31 are with 
capitalist countries (10 with Hong Kong; 
7 with J apan: 2 with USA， Canada， Ger 
rnany and Taiwan; and 1 with Austria， 
England， Switzerland， South Korea， Sing-
apore， and Macao). Thus foreign invest 
rnents are concentrated on the ex-CMEA 
countries and on the rnining industry. In 
F巴bruary1991， the Petrol巴urnLaw was 
enacted which perrnitted foreign inves-
tors to hold rnining rights for 20 years， 
but foreign investrnents are not expected 
to occur very soon. 
The new Foreign Investrnent Law is 
under discussion in parliarnent and is 
scheduled to enter into force in 1993. It 
is revised to create rnore favorable con 
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ditions for foreign investors， including 
investment guarantees， tax exemptions 
for 5-13 years depending on the indus-
try， region and so on. To encourage 
further investments， free economic zones 
or processing zones will be set up in 
some regions upon the creation of 
appropriate economic and legal prere-
quisites. But a basic problem is a fear of 
economic control by Chinese investors， 
which makes the policy decision difficult 
politically. Another problem is a lack of 
policy coordination among foreign invest-
ment， international trade and industrial 
policies， though they should promote eco-
nomic development in c10se cooperation. 
3. Problems of Economic Reform 
We have seen minor problems of 
economic reforms in reviewing their de-
velopments. Th巴reare some major prob 
lems inherent to an economy in transi-
tion， which will be discussed in this sec-
tion: problems of a shock therapy 
approach to economic reform， price liber-
alization without effective markets， and 
economic inequality in the transitional 
period. 
(1) Shock Therapy Approach to 
Economic Reform 
There are two types of economic re 
form: shock therapy and gradualism. The 
former is an approach to transforming a 
centrally-planned economy to a market-
oriented economy as soon and thoroughly 
as possible. The following measures are 
carried out together at one time: to liber-
alize trade and prices， to open up the 
economy to the world， to unify foreign 
exchange rates through devaluation， to 
reduce budget deficits mainly by cutting 
subsidies， to privatize state enterprises， 
and to increase interest rates with finan-
cial reform. This approach was adopted 
in Poland from 1990， Czechoslovakia 
and Romania from 1991 and Russia from 
1992. The latter is a gradual approach 
to a market-oriented economy， and the 
above mentioned measures are intro-
duced step by step in accordance with 
economic conditions; it takes longer to 
complete the transition to a market-
oriented economy. 
The IMF and the W or ld Bank are in 
favor of the shock therapy and have so 
far recommended or persuaded the ex-
socialist countries inc1uding Mongolia to 
adopt such an approach. As we have 
seen in the former section， the govern 
ment of Mongolia had started economic 
reforms in 1990 and has carried out 
most of them in a short time. About 90% 
of prices were liberalized in sales value 
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by J uly 1992， and almost al prices are 
scheduled to be lib巴ralizedby the end of 
the year. Wages and salaries became de 
termined freely by the private enter 
prises from 1991. For one year to July 
1992， over 50% of assets under large 
privatization and around 70% of assets 
under small privatization were trans-
fered to private ownership. Some 5(}OA> of 
agricultural output and 15% of industrial 
output were produced in the first half of 
1992. Subsidies were sharply cut and 
their share in GDP fel from 16.2% in 
1990 to 5.8% in 1991. The minimum re 
serve requirements were increased from 
8.5% to 40% in 1992， and the interest 
rate to commercial banks boosted to 
120% in September 1992. Almost al ex-
port restrictions have already been 
lifted， and in the near future the state 
order system and the import licence are 
to be abolished. Th巴 foreignexchange 
rate was devalued several times in two 
and half years from 3 tugriks to 150 
tugriks per dollar. 
In 1992， the UNDP recommended 
Mongolia a similar approach to what the 
IMF and the World Bank had recom-
mended for other countries. According to 
a policy r巴commendationsubmitted by 
UNDP to the Donor Consultation meeting 
held in U1aanbaatar， 14.15 October 
1992， the short term strategy should be 
as follows. 
“The basis of the government's short 
term strategy to overcome the crisis lies 
in conducting policies to speed up the 
process of transition to a market eco-
nomy. To achieve this objective the gov 
ernment will take the following mea-
sures: to complete privatization in the 
shortest possible time; to liberalize the 
remaining prices under state control; to 
revise existing legislation to make it 
appropriate to a market economy; to re-
duce the current shortages of food and 
consumer goods; and to improve the op-
erations of the fuel， energy and export 
..20 
oriented industries." 
The Mongolian government accepted 
the recommendation in principle. A kind 
of shock therapy has been adopted in 
Mongolia and it will be strengthened 
from now on. But this approach has 
turned out to be rather problematic in 
East European countries and Russia. 
According to the data of the EBRD~l in 
Poland， where a shock therapy was in-
troduced in 1990， the real GDP dec1ined 
by 12% in 1990， 9% in 1991 and 0% in 
1992， the CPI (Consumer Price Index) 
20 Ibid. 
21 European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development， Annual Economic Revie叩， 1992 
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rose by 249% in 1990， 60% in 1991 
and 40-45% in 1992; the unemployment 
rate increased from 6.1% in 1990 to 
11.4% in 1991 and 13% in 1992. In 
Czechoslovakia， where such an approach 
was adopted in 1991， the real GDP de-
creased by 16% in 1991 and 7% in 
1992， the CPI rose by 54% in 1991 and 
12% in 1992， and the unemployment 
rate was 6.6% in 1991. In Romania， 
where a shock therapy was implemented 
in 1991， the real GDP fel by 13% in 
1991 and 8% in 1992， the CPI rose by 
223% in 1991 and 160% in 1992， and 
the unemployment rate ascended from 
2.9% in 1991 to 7% in 1992. Finally， in 
the Russian Republic， where the program 
for economic reform was adopted in 
1990 and the radical reforms were car-
ried out in 1992， the real NMP dropped 
by 3.6% in 1990， 11.0% in 1991 and 
20% in 1992， the retail prices rose by 
152% in 1991 and 2200% in 1992， and 
the unemployment rate was 3% in 1992 
but is increasing sharply in 1993. 
As well documented in these coun-
tries， the shock therapy first caused a 
sharp drop in output and a steep rise in 
prices. These shocks tended to diminish 
in the following years， but the effects 
accumulated， thereby increasing unem-
ployment year by year. The “transition 
costs" proved to be very high in these 
countries where no one had experienced 
unemployment. 
Similar effects were found in Mongo-
lia after a broad economic reform was in-
itiated in 1991: the real GDP shrank by 
9% in 1991 and 5-13% in 1992， the 
CPI rose by 54% in 1991 and 145% in 
the first seven months of 1992， and un-
employment more than doubled from 
24.8 thousand at the end of 1990 to 
55.4 thousand persons (about 8%) at the 
end of 1991. 
But as we have seen in section 1， 
such drops in GDP are partly attribuι 
able to the cumulative effect of dimi-
nishing aid from the Soviet Union. It is， 
therefore， expected in the future that the 
economy will be damaged more seriously 
if economic reform is carried out thor-
oughly and quickly as the UNDP recom-
mended. A more gradual approach is 
necessary to consider in order to low巴r
the transition costs. 
(2) Price Liberalization without 
日fectiveMarkets 
The W orld Bank and the IMF 
almost always recommend to liberalize 
prices and to get them right. It may be 
an appropriate policy for advanced mar-
ket economies， but it is not at al 
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appropriate for an economy in transition 
from a centrally-planned economy be-
cause effective markets do not yet exist. 
Theoretically， effecti ve mar k巴tsrequire 
several conditions: negligible transaction 
costs， no government intervention， and 
perfect competition; the last one is well 
known to be made of homogeneous goods 
or services traded， many suppliers and 
consumers， perfect information， and free 
entry and exit. 
It is apparent that most are not 
satisfied in Mongolia. Now that the cen-
tral planning and state order system is 
eliminated or diminishing，“market in-
frastructure" such as economic laws and 
institutions for transactions must be set 
up in a short time. But it takes rather 
long to establish this infrastructure and 
then to accumulate sufficient experiences 
to make transaction costs low enough. In 
addition， most Mongolian people are not 
used to market transactions， and the 
number of merchants and brokers are 
not enough for well-functioning markets. 
Furthermore， the previous state order 
system stil remains with the influential 
bureaucracy of the old regime likely to 
intervene into markets. 
But the biggest problem is monopoly 
and monopsony broadly found in Mongo-
lia. In the CMEA system， production of a 
certain good was concentrated in a very 
few enterprises so as to achieve econo-
mies of scale. In most industries， there 
exists only one enterprise to produce a 
particular good in Mongolia. Then if 
prices are liberalized， enterprises tend to 
increase prices to get monopolistic pro-
fits which are much higher than those in 
perfectly competitive markets. A low 
level of infrastructure such as transport 
and communication facilities prevents im-
port competition from easing such a 
problem. A small scale market with 2.2 
million consumers would make foreign 
investors hesitate to come and produce 
in Mongolia. These obstacles tend to hin-
der prices from finding a correct level 
and from functioning as signals to allo-
cate scarce resources optimally. It will 
take a long time to overcome these obsta-
cles， and this is another reason why a 
gradual approach is necessary for Mon-
golia 
More importantly， itmay be that the 
dichotomy of markets and planning itself 
has the problem of oversimplification. 
Both markets and planning have advan-
tages and disadvantages; the market-
price mechanism has its limits， known as 
market failure. Planning is better used 
for greater modification in real variables 
against an earlier situation even in a 
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market economy. As Janos Kornai prop-
erly pointed out，“明Tithina given system， 
planning is given a greater role in more 
highly concentrated industries， in fun-
damental decisions involving greater 
risks and relating to indivisible major 
units， and in the control of effects not 
measurable with prices，" such as exter-
22 
nalities and public goods. 
Theoretically， a price change will in 
duce both changes in production and in 
consumption， then a proper industrial 
structure and an expenditure composi-
tion will result. But supply and demand 
responses may be too slow because of a 
high concentration of industries， high 
risks， technical indivisibilities and/or 
high adjustment costs to cope with a new 
condition， or there may be no response at 
al from the supply side simply because 
there exists no producers. Price liber-
alization may stimulate or promote their 
activities， but it wi1l not in itself create 
capitalists， entrepreneurship or manage-
rial talent. 
In such a case， some industrial poli-
cies， including small business assistance， 
are necessary in order to supplement the 
market mechanism. It is expected that an 
economy in transition takes longer to 
22 Kornai. J. Anti-Equilibrium， 1971 
cope with a totally different price struc 
ture， and that the government should 
adopt positive industrial policies to 
promote or to create essential producers. 
In any case， market and planning must 
go hand in hand， and we should not fal 
into the false dichotomy. 
One important price， the foreign ex-
change rate， illustrates the above men 
tioned problems very well. Mongolia's 
currency was devaluated from 40 to 150 
tugriks per dollar in January 1993. This 
is one of the attempts to reduce trade d巴
ficits equivalent to 30-40% of GDP. 
But this will not only be ineffective to 
improve the balance of payments posi-
tion， but also will it be detrimental to 
Mongolia's economy and people. 
First， provided the present condition 
that over 80% of exports are minerals 
and raw materials with low price elasti 
cities of demand and that two-thirds of 
imports are indispensable inputs for pro-
duction whose price elasticities of de-
mand are also low， the devaluation will 
not improve the balance of payments 
position very much. In order to reduce 
trade deficits， Mongolia's trade structure 
must be changed by altering her produc-
tion and consumption structures， but it 
will take rather long. 
Secondly， not a nominal rate but a 
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real rate must be kept low for improving 
the external balance， but devaluation 
tends to cause high inflation through ris-
ing import prices in Mongolia， quickly 
resulting in a further devaluation_ A 
spiral will tend to start between devalua-
tion and inflation_ Import substitution 
policies are needed to mitigate such a 
spiral， but it takes long for the policies 
to produce a sufficient effecL 
Thirdly， devaluation improves an 
external trade balanc巴， theoretically， by 
reducing domestic expenditures and by 
switching the expenditures from tradable 
to non-tradable goods， but such expendi-
ture reduction and switching are ex-
tremely difficult to realize in the present 
condition when real expenditures were 
already reduced by a sharp drop in im-
ports and domestic production (real in-
come per capita declined by 42% be-
tween 1990 and 1991)_ If such an ex 
penditure reduction does happen in Mon-
golia， political instability is most likely 
to result through social unrest 
Another important price， the in-
t巴restrate， has similar problems_ First， 
the deposit rates of savings accounts 
were increased from 8% in 1991 to 8-
36% in 1992， but the inflation rates 
(general CPI) were much higher: 54% in 
1991 and 145% in the first eight months 
of 1992_ The real rates of interest were 
thus negative， so that individuals time 
savings deposits declined in real value 
by 48_2% from January 1 to September 
23 
1， 1992:-Price stabilization is necessary 
to make the real interest rates positive_ 
Secondly， a lack of confidence has 
aggravated the problem; Mongolia's bank 
system has not yet established the confi 
dence of the public， particularly in the 
status quo where only a limited amount 
of savings can be drawn from a bank 
freely_ People tend to hoard their money 
instead of putting it in a bank_ As long 
as such a restriction and the high rate of 
inflation last， itwill be difficult for the 
bank to win confidence and col1ect 
money from the public_ It will take some 
time to stabilize prices and to recover 
the public's confidence_ 
Thirdly and more fundamentally， 
real saving or the release of productive 
resources may not be possible in Mongo 
lia_ Her economy may be too poor to pro-
duce a significant amount of surplus for 
investment Or most fundamentally， this 
country may have a common problem to 
most developing countries: a lack of 
capacity to invest In such a case， no-
thing will change by liberalizing the 
23 Bank of Mongolia 
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interest rates. Economic recovery and de-
velopment are the essential prerequisites 
to produce some surplus for investment， 
and a long-range policy is necessary to 
build the capacity to invest. 
(3) Economic Inequality 
in the Transitional Period 
Economic liberalization is likely to 
increase economic inequality among indi-
viduals in general and between urban 
and rural areas in particular. When 
great巴ropportunities occur through eco-
nomic liberalization， some can seize the 
opportunities by chance or with talents， 
and others miss or are not offered them 
or are incapable of utilizing them. The 
greater the opportunities open to indi-
viduals， the greater the inequality among 
them. The process is cumulative as the 
Bible states: haves get richer and have-
nots get poorer. As long as the principle 
of equal opportunity holds， such an ine-
quality is regarded as a necessary evil 
for economic development， and the losers 
are to be h巴lpedby the social welfare 
measures or the social safety net. 
The problem is that the principle of 
equal opportunities does not hold in most 
cases. First， good opportunities tend to 
concentrate in urban areas， where most 
foreign aid is spent and where most eco-
nomic activities are carried out. External 
economies in urban areas attract more 
and more money， activities and people to 
the cities， and the cities grow bigger and 
bigger to generate more external econo-
mies. Thus city dwellers can enjoy more 
and better opportunities than rural peo-
ple. This is a common tendency in almost 
al countries， but it is conspicuous in de-
veloping countries who receive a dis-
proportionately large amount of foreign 
assistance. Mongolia is a perfect exam 
ple. The fiscal deficits of as much as 
17% of GDP had been financed by fore 
ign aid; one-third of the total population 
concentrate in the largest three cities， 
and it is extremely difficult or costly to 
extend social services to sparsely popu-
lated rural areas. Such social services as 
general education and health care are 
planned to be cut in rural areas so as to 
reduce budgetary deficits， but this will 
further worsen the present unequal 
opportunities between urban and rural 
dwellers with the resultant economic ine 
quality. 
Secondly， materials shortage and 
price inflation in the transitional period 
tend to widen the gap between haves and 
have-nots. One reason is that real asset 
holders are more resistant to shortages 
and inflation than workers， and farmers 
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and factory workers can tide over the 
period of hardship much better than 
office workers. An underground巴conomy
develops in such a period， and it expands 
the gap between them. Another reason is 
that foreign currencies are the best 
means to protect value against inflation， 
but everyone does not have equal access 
to US dol1ars. Now that foreign exchange 
earned above state orders and earned by 
private exporters can be retained or sold 
in free markets， some enterprises and 
traders can be immune to price inflation 
and curr巴ncydevaluation. On the other 
hand， the unemployed， the aged， the 
handicapped， widows， orphans， pension. 
ers， and other weaker members of 
Mongolian society are so dependent on 
their savings or some payments fixed in 
domestic currency， that they are quite 
vulnerable to inflation. 
According to the UNDP，“At present 
there are a total of 69，000 families， 
approximately 350，000 people， living be. 
low the official minimum income level， of 
which 30，600 are elderly with low in. 
come， 12，000 are invalids， and 22，400， 
are single mothers with many children，" 
and “every second person in this country 
has received benefits from the social 
24 
security system".-' Differentiating effects 
24 UNDP， op. cit. 
of inflation is therefore strong in Mongo. 
lia. Social security and insurance ser. 
vices are necessary to protect such peo田
ple， unfortunately it will also increase 
government deficits. 
Thirdly， economic reform may 
worsen economic inequality among indi 
viduals. Privatization by vouchers， for 
example， was meant to make each citizen 
an equal stockholder of public enter田
prises. In reality， however， not al enter 
prises are making profits and have stock 
worth owing. If an enterprise is doing 
very well， everyone wants to get its 
shares， but the first priority is given to 
the workers who are engaged in that en. 
terprise. The others can get the remain. 
ing shares， but usual1y none are left for 
outsiders. Public servants， in particular， 
have less access to profitable stocks 
since they did not work for any 
25 
enterprises:-The same holds true of the 
unemployed， the aged， the handicapped， 
widows， orphans， pensioners， and so on. 
The vouchers mean almost nothing to 
them， and they sometimes exchange their 
25 A few of them， however， may have beter 
access to useful information to gain money. The 
members of the State Privatization Commission. 
for example， have access to“insider 
information" of enterprises to be privatized and 
can easily make money by utilizing the 
information. Generally speaking， ina period of 
economic chaos， those who have accurate and 
up.tρ.date information can make money 
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vouchers for a bottle of vodka or some 
thing. Thus many vouchers tend to con-
centrate in the hands of a small number 
of people. Those people will then have a 
larger share of profit-making enterprises. 
This is just an example of how people 
become economically unequal through 
economic reform. Similar problems hap-
pen in many ways in the transitional 
period. 
But a more fundamental problem is 
whether or not such a concentration of 
capital is necessary for economic de-
velopment. According to the Kuznets 
curve argument， income distribution of a 
very poor country gets uneven as her 
economy begins to develop， but it becom-
es more even as her economy develops 
further. Higher inequality was consi-
dered to be inevitable for accelerating 
economic growth by concentrating in 
come in a small number of capitalists 
who are most likely to invest. Then a 
trickle-down effect was expected to 
equalize the income distribution in the 
second phase. But this argument was de-
nied by the fact that some Asian NIEs 
succeeded in rapid economic growth with 
26 
even distribution of income. A recent 
study examined the data of income dis-
26 Chenery. H.B. et al. Redistribution捌 thGrowth. 
1974 
tribution and concluded “that high 
growth need not come at the expense of 
improved equality and the sharing of the 
poor in growth， provided appropriate 
policies are in place."Z7 For Asian NIEs， 
the policies were land reforms， agricultu-
ral development and a strategy of labor-
intensive growth. The problem boils 
down to what is the appropriate econo-
mic strategy for Mongolia， but it lies out-
side the scope of this paper. We must 
leave that topic for another paper. 
27 James， W.， S.Naya and G. M. Meier， Asi仰
Development， 1989， p.205. 
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